



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

Issue No. 936, 30 August 2011

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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

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Deccan Chronicle – India

US, Israel Concerned about Syrian Weapons: Report

August 27, 2011

Agence France-Presse (AFP)

Washington - The United States and Israel are monitoring Syria's suspected arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, fearing that terror groups could take advantage of the revolt against President Bashar al-Assad to obtain chemical agents and long-range missiles, The Wall Street Journal reported late on Friday.

Citing unnamed officials from both countries, the newspaper said US intelligence services believe Syria's non-conventional weapons programs include significant stockpiles of mustard gas, VX and Sarin gas and the missile and artillery systems to deliver them.

United Nations investigators also recently concluded that Damascus had been secretly constructing a nuclear reactor with North Korean help before Israeli jets destroyed the site in late 2007, the report said.

US and UN nonproliferation officials continue to worry that Pyongyang may have provided Syria with additional nuclear-related equipment, The Journal noted.

"We are very concerned about the status of Syria's WMD, including chemical weapons," the paper quoted Israel's ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, as saying.

"Together with the US administration, we are watching this situation very carefully."

US and Israeli officials won't disclose exactly how they are keeping watch on the Syrian weaponry, the report said.

But in the past, the United States and Israel have tracked activities at Syrian military installations using satellites and human spies, the paper pointed out.

Current and former US officials said Syria has at least five sites where it produces chemical-weapons agents, including mustard gas, Sarin and VX, The Journal noted.

But the officials said these facilities are difficult to track as they are spread across Syria and centered in such cities as Damascus, Hama, Latakia and Aleppo, the report said.

Some production facilities are at military facilities that also store Syria's Scud missiles, The Journal noted.

<http://www.deccanchronicle.com/channels/world/asia/us-israel-concerned-about-syrian-weapons-report-606>

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Islam Tribune – United States

Iran Defence Ministry Opens Carbon Fiber Plant

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)

August 27, 2011

TEHRAN (AFP) - (AFP) - Iran on Saturday inaugurated a plant for producing carbon fiber, which it is banned from importing by international sanctions targeting dual-use materials, the official IRNA news agency reported.

"Today we are witnessing the fulfillment of a strategic project of the Ministry of Defence," Defence Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi said as he inaugurated the production facility, IRNA reported.

"We are among 10 nations producing (carbon fiber)," he added.

"All of the design- and manufacturing phases of the machinery for carbon fiber production have been carried out in the ministry of defence," Vahidi added.

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"Not only the manufacturing technology but the carbon fiber itself was on the list of the sanctioned materials," he said.

The "restrictions challenged us to build advanced defence systems," Vahidi added, referring to an international embargo against dual-use goods that can be used for conventional weapons and in the nuclear industry.

Iran has been slapped by four sets of UN sanctions and additional sanctions by its archfoe Washington, and the European Union, over its controversial nuclear programme.

Western powers suspect Tehran seeks an atomic weapons capability under the guise of its civilian space and nuclear programmes, a charge it vehemently denies.

"Carbon fiber has many uses in defence fields, including in the manufacture of heat shields... the fuselages of solid fuel composite missiles, airplane wings, the fuselage of warplanes and some lightweight weaponry," Vahidi said..

Carbon fiber can also be used in the nuclear industry, particularly for the rotors of centrifuges to enrich uranium, according to experts.

Enriched uranium can be used to produce both the fuel for a nuclear reactor and the fissile material for an atomic warhead.

Iran has increased in the past two years the development, testing and unveiling of new "indigenous" military equipment, including missiles, and regularly boasts about developing them with substantial range and capabilities.

Western military experts, however, cast doubt over its claims.

<http://www.islamtribune.com/2011/08/27/iran-defence-ministry-opens-carbon-fiber-plant.html>

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Al Arabiya News – U.A.E.

Israel 'Could Not Stop' Nuclear Iran with One Strike, Says Top Defense Official

Monday, 29 August 2011

By Reuters

Israel would not be able to halt Iran's reported quest for atomic weapons with a single strike, a senior Israeli defense official said on Sunday.

Israel and the West suspect Iran is trying to use its nuclear program to develop atomic weapons, a charge denied by Tehran which says it wants to generate electricity.

Both Israel and the United States have hinted they might consider taking military action as a last resort to stop Iran getting the bomb.

The defense official, who in line with Israeli army guidelines declined to be identified, mentioned Iran during a review of the security situation in the Middle East in a briefing to foreign reporters.

"We're not talking about Iraq or Syria where one strike would derail a program," the official said, referring to Israel's 1981 air strike that destroyed Iraq's atomic reactor and the bombing in 2007 of a Syrian site which the UN atomic agency said was very likely a nuclear reactor.

"With Iran it's a different project. There is no one silver bullet you can hit and that's over," the official said.

Israeli leaders have urged the United States and other Western countries to present Tehran with a credible military threat to back up economic sanctions already in place.

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The official said the United States stood a better chance of forcing Iran to change its mind over its nuclear program than Israel.

“With all respect to Israel ... the greatest fear of the (Iranian) regime is the USA. There is no question about it.”

Some analysts say the likelihood of an imminent Israeli war with Iran has ebbed, thanks to the perceived success of political pressure on Tehran.

Recent Israeli estimates do not show Iran developing nuclear weapons before 2015.

Israel is widely believed to have the only nuclear arsenal in the Middle East, and Iran has accused it of hypocrisy over the issue.

<http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/29/164504.html>

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FARS News Agency – Iran
Monday, 29 August 2011

Iran Passes Death Sentence on Murderer of N. Scientist

TEHRAN (FNA) - Iran's revolution court sentenced to death a Mossad-affiliated terrorist who assassinated an Iranian nuclear scientist last year.

Iran's Prosecutor-General and Judiciary Spokesman Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejeii said that the terrorist was sentenced to death for "waging war against God".

Majid Jamali Fashi had pleaded guilty to murdering Massoud Ali-Mohammadi in January 2010.

The trial of Majid Jamali Fashi was held in Tehran last Tuesday.

Ali Mohammadi's family had asked for a death penalty for Jamali Fashi for his direct role in the assassination of the nuclear scientist.

Earlier, Tehran's Public and Revolution Courts Prosecutor Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi had announced that Jamali Fashi had been trained in Mossad's military bases.

"The suspect in this case, named Majid Jamali Fashi, had traveled to Israel several times and had received the necessary trainings for the assassination in Mossad's bases," Jafari Dolatabadi.

He also stated that Jamali Fashi had received \$120,000 from the Zionist regime to carry out the assassination and then returned to Iran.

Majid Jamali Fashi said in his confessions aired by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) on January 11, "I became acquainted with a number of Israeli officers on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway after we had a visit to Israel and I received different training courses, including chasing, running, counter-chasing and techniques for planting bombs in a car."

The terrorist added that he had also been trained in that Israeli garrison how to carry out bomb attacks while riding a motorcycle.

Jamali Fashi also said that he had received psychological and operational briefings for assassinating Dr. Ali Mohammadi and had exercised the bombing plot for killing the Iranian scientist several times at the Israeli garrison.

He also mentioned during his confessions that small models of Dr. Mohammadi's house and his house surroundings were used during his training course.

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<http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9006070002>

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Atlanta Journal-Constitution
Monday, August 29, 2011

Iran Won't Stop Uranium Enrichment Program

The Associated Press

TEHRAN, Iran — Iran won't stop uranium enrichment activities the U.N. has demanded it halt, the country's nuclear chief said Monday.

Iran says it needs stockpiles for a medical research reactor, and that the level of enrichment — up to 20 percent — is far below the more than 90 percent needed to build a nuclear weapon. But U.S. officials have expressed concern Iran is taking steps toward greater enrichment.

Iran denies claims by the U.S. and its allies it seeks to build a nuclear weapon.

The official IRNA news agency on Monday quoted nuclear chief Fereidoun Abbasi as saying that Iran will continue to enrich uranium to 3.5 percent in its main uranium enrichment plant in Natanz but will carry out 20 percent enrichment activities at its underground Fordo site.

IRNA also quoted Abbasi as saying Iran had asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide documentation of accusations about its nuclear program "so that we can examine them."

He added: "These allegations must be limited and not continue. We are not required to respond should thousands of claims be raised regarding our country's nuclear issue."

The International Atomic Energy Agency claims that Iran continues to stonewall attempts to follow up on information it has received from member states that points to possible experiments with a nuclear weapons program.

Iran accuses a "few arrogant countries" — a phrase it often uses to refer to the United States and its allies — of providing misinformation and false information to the IAEA.

<http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/iran-wont-stop-uranium-1150576.html>

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Bloomberg News

Iran Space Agency Set to Send Monkey Into Orbit, ISNA Reports

By Yeganeh Salehi
August 30, 2011

Iran plans to send a monkey into orbit as part of a plan to eventually send humans into space, Iran's ISNA news agency reported, citing Hamid Fazeli, head of the country's space agency.

A so-called life-capsule, carried by a Kavoshgar-5 carrier-rocket, will lift off with a rhesus monkey, Fazeli said, according to ISNA.

The government is portraying Iran's technological and space achievements as a symbol of independence from the western world while the U.S. and its allies express concern that the projects may have military applications.

The first Iranian-made satellite, called Omid, was launched as part of the country's space program in February 2009. In February 2010, Iran fired a domestically produced rocket into space with a satellite carrying two turtles, a rat and several worms.

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The U.S. and many of its allies are trying to limit Iran's development of nuclear technology, saying the atomic program may be part of a secret plan to build weapons. Iran says its satellite launches are for research and telecommunications purposes, and that its nuclear work is purely civilian

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-30/iran-space-agency-set-to-send-monkey-into-orbit-isna-reports.html>

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Business Insider – New York, NY

China's About to Outfit Its Subs with Controversial "First-Strike" Nuclear Warheads

By Robert Johnson

August 27, 2011

While adding to its stockpile of almost 200 nuclear warheads, China is on the verge of arming itself with a new highly effective, multi-stage nuclear weapon.

The Washington Times devoted some attention to the new Pentagon report on China's military strategy and found the CCP is using this third missile to compliment its medium and long-range nukes.

This new armament is an intercontinental ballistic missile equipped with a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).

Put simply, this means the Chinese are creating a "first-strike" warhead that was hotly contested for its destabilizing effects during the Cold War and could increase their nuclear stockpile exponentially.

The Soviets wanted to ban MIRVs completely as early as the late 1960s.

MIRVs are mobile, can be put inside submarines and carry multiple warheads, capable of striking several targets, or just one target far more effectively than traditional missiles.

The Russians, who already admitted to helping China's fighter jet program, have highly advanced MIRV technology in their RSM-56 Bulava submarine missile which just went into serial production.

China's new warhead will compliment its new Jin-Class ballistic missile submarine the Pentagon says "appears ready" to enter the CCP fleet.

In addition to sending MIRVs out with its submarines China is also storing its warheads in underground facilities connected by 3,000 miles of "obscure tunnel network[s]".

Richard Fisher, of the International Assessment and Strategy Center told the Times, "Taken together, a well-protected, growing ICBM force that will soon have active defenses should be of great concern to the United States."

<http://www.businessinsider.com/pentagon-report-china-nuclear-weapons-mirv-2011-8>

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Miami Herald

Tuesday, August 30, 2011

SKorea's President Replaces Point Man on NKorea

By HYUNG-JIN KIM, Associated Press

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SEOUL, South Korea -- South Korea's president replaced the conservative Cabinet minister who has handled North Korean relations in an appointment Tuesday seen as signaling his willingness to improve ties with Pyongyang after more than a year of troubling tension.

As the new unification minister, Yu Woo-ik is expected to play an important role in establishing "future-oriented" inter-Korean ties, a statement from President Lee Myung-bak's office said.

The former chief presidential secretary is one of Lee's close associates and also served as South Korea's ambassador in China.

Yu will replace Hyun In-taek, who led a hard-line policy on Pyongyang, which has subsequently accused him of undermining ties between the countries.

"The unification minister's replacement is like sending a message to North Korea that (South Korea) will be flexible and try to improve ties," said Yang Moo-jin, a professor at Seoul-based University of North Korean Studies.

Yu will have a confirmation hearing but his nomination doesn't need parliamentary approval.

Hyun will become a presidential adviser on unification policy. Lee also replaced four other Cabinet-level officials, including the culture minister Tuesday, the statement said.

Ties between the Koreas remain strained after two deadly attacks the South blamed on Pyongyang last year. However, there have been recent glimmers of diplomatic hope on the Korean peninsula, and senior officials from the United States and both Koreas met last month to discuss a possible resumption of long-dormant negotiations on ending the North's nuclear weapons program in return for aid.

During a visit to Russia last week, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il reportedly offered to impose a nuclear test and production moratorium if the six-nation nuclear disarmament talks resume. South Korea and the United States have said North Korea must keep its prior commitments before the nuclear talks can resume.

<http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/08/30/2381673/skoreas-president-replaces-point.html>

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Xinhua News Agency – China

August 30, 2011

Chinese Disarmament Association Pledges More Efforts for Global Peace

(Xinhua)

Beijing -- The China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) pledged on Tuesday to make greater efforts toward arms control and world peace.

The international security situation has undergone complex and profound changes during the first decade of the 21st century, which in many ways is related to international arms control and the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, said CACDA president Ma Zhengang as the non-governmental organization marked its tenth anniversary.

Founded on 21 August 2001, the non-profit CACDA received the Special Consultative Status from the UN Economic and Social Council in 2005.

It aims to facilitate better communication between the government and the civil society and between the business community and the Chinese public.

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The association also engages in international exchanges and public diplomacy by promoting mutual understanding between China and other countries.

According to Ma, the CACDA is in close contact with many non-governmental organizations and think tanks in the United States, Russia, Japan, India, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other countries.

It has also jointly organized seven bilateral meetings on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation with James Martin Centre for Non-proliferation Studies of the Monitory Institute of International Studies of the United States over the past years.

"Nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, nuclear security, regional nuclear issues, prevention of an arms race in the outer space, cyber security, arms sales -- all, without exception, affect global and regional security and stability and pertain to the vital interests of all nations," said Ma, who is the former Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom.

The CACDA has more than 30 members from government and defence agencies and universities and research institutions, and has more than 200 individual members, most of whom are experts and scholars in the field of international security, arms control and disarmament.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-08/30/c_131084386.htm

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Business Standard – India

August, 29 2011

New Delhi could Have Anti-Missile Shield by 2014

By Ajai Shukla in New Delhi

According to a new Pentagon report on China's military, Beijing has paid India a sort of compliment. The People's Liberation Army now targets India with its best and latest nuclear-tipped missiles, the solid-fuel Dongfeng-21 (NATO designation: CSS-5) medium range ballistic missile (IRBM), tipped with a 250-kiloton nuclear warhead that would flatten a large part of Delhi. Until now, India had been considered deserving only of China's oldest and most decrepit missile, the primitive, liquid-fuelled Dongfeng-3 (NATO designation CSS-2).

India's defence establishment is taking this new threat seriously, as also that posed by Pakistan's nuclear-tipped MRBMs — like the Ghauri-2 and the Shaheen-2 — which can strike targets 2300 kilometres away. In an exclusive interview with Business Standard, the Defence R&D Organisation's chief missile scientist has announced that, within three years, India will have a fully deployed missile-defence shield to safeguard a city like New Delhi from missile-borne nuclear attack.

Termed an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) shield, this complex system has been in the making since 1996. The DRDO is satisfied with the system's ability to detect and track an incoming missile, and then launch an interceptor missile to destroy it while it is still in space (exo-atmospheric interception). If that misses, there is a second interceptor that homes in on the enemy missile while it is in the upper atmosphere (endo-atmospheric interception). In internationally watched tests, these interceptors have been tested thrice each.

But only now has the DRDO announced that a fully integrated ABM system is close to deployment. Says Dr Avinash Chander, the DRDO's Chief Controller for Missiles and Strategic Systems; "We can deploy an effective ABM system for a single city within 3 years from now. We can definitely ensure the safety of one city in that time frame. After that, the [ABM shield for] other cities will follow."

Chander will not confirm that Delhi will receive India's first ABM shield but, given Delhi's vulnerability to MRBMs from Pakistan and China, and its status as the capital city, experts predict that it will almost certainly be the first city to be safeguarded.

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“We are planning more ABM trials in a month or two. Both exo and endo-atmospheric interceptors are doing well in development. We already have a demonstrated capability against enemy missiles that are fired from up to 2000 kilometres away. After some more trials we will be going into deployment mode. The ground systems and the missiles are going to be available... there is no issue,” says Chander.

The sophistication of an ABM system depends upon the range of the incoming enemy missile. The longer the range of the incoming missile, the faster it travels and the more difficult it is to detect and shoot it down. The missiles that currently target India — the Shaheen; the Ghauri; and the Dongfeng-21 — can all be successfully intercepted, says the DRDO.

“Pakistan can only target India with missiles that have ranges of less than 3000 kilometers, otherwise the missile will overshoot India. Our ABM system will be capable of detecting and shooting down incoming missiles from those ranges,” says Chander.

However China, with its arsenal of longer-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and the geographical space to launch missiles from thousands of kilometres away, is capable of defeating India’s ABM system in its current form. The DRDO says that it will gradually enhance the ABM system to enable the interception of longer-range missiles.

For now, deployment is on track, says the DRDO’s missile chief. The radar network that is needed to detect an incoming enemy missile is already being sited. This includes a Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR), which Bangalore-based Electronics and Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) has developed in collaboration with Israeli company, ELTA. The LRTR picks up incoming missiles at ranges out to 300 kilometres.

The ABM system also has a “guidance radar”, which tracks the incoming missile in its terminal phase and guides the interceptor missile onto the target. The DRDO developed the guidance radar in collaboration with French company, Thales. In addition, ABM systems also use satellite-based detection systems to detect enemy missile launches.

ABM systems are controversial; strategists argue that they destabilise a nuclear balance, incentivising the production of more nuclear weapons to defeat an enemy’s ABM shield. Indeed, Pakistan now has the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenal after it aggressively expanded its Khushab reactor complex to produce more plutonium for bombs.

<http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/new-delhi-could-have-anti-missile-shield-by-2014/447350/>

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The Hindu – India

Balasore (Orissa), August 29, 2011

Agni-II Launch Postponed

Technical snag found in control system in first stage

By T.S. Subramanian

A scheduled launch of Agni-II missile on Monday was postponed by about a week following a technical snag.

“We did not want to go ahead with the launch because we made some observation of the control system of the vehicle’s first stage,” a missile technologist of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) said.

Agni-II, with an intermediate range of 2,500 km, carries a one-tonne nuclear warhead. The missile was to have lifted off around 10 a.m. from the Wheeler Island, off Dhamra village on the Orissa coast. The Strategic Forces Command of the Army, which handles nuclear weapons-delivery systems, was to conduct the launch.

The DRDO had been facing problems related to the control system in its missile missions. Prithvi, which forms part of the interceptor missile system, veered off its path and did not reach its required altitude of 110 km on March



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15, 2010. It reached a height of only 60 to 70 km and tumbled into the Bay of Bengal. The malfunctioning of a component in the control and guidance system was said to be the reason for the failure. On December 10, 2010, the maiden launch of Agni-II Prime missile failed, again owing to a problem in the control system in the first stage.

After the launch of Agni-II, the DRDO will concentrate on launching the Agni-II Prime in October. It has a range of 2,500 to 3,000 km.

The DRDO plans to launch Agni-V, which has a range of more than 5,000 km, in December.

The K-15 missile, which will form part of the arsenal of nuclear-powered submarine Arihant, is already under production. It has a range of 700 km.

The DRDO is working on K-4 underwater-launched missile, which can attack targets 3,000 km away.

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2408881.ece>

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Reuters Africa – Africa

Namibia Arrests Four in Suspected Nuclear Theft

By Reuters

Monday, August 29, 2011

WINDHOEK (Reuters) - Namibian authorities have arrested four people they suspect of stealing drums of radioactive material from a mine in the country that is a major exporter of uranium, officials said on Monday.

The four were arrested on Friday in the coastal town of Swakopmund, the drums have been recovered and the material is thought to have come from Areva's Trekkopje mine, they said.

Axel Tibinyane, regulator of the Atomic Energy Board of Namibia, said the contents of the drums are radioactive.

"The next step is to confirm that the material is indeed uranium oxide, but physical observation points in that direction. This will also allow us to fingerprint the origin of the material," Tibinyane told Reuters.

The spokesperson in Namibia for the French nuclear firm Areva, Sugnet Smit, told Reuters: "The situation is very sensitive. Tests have been conducted to see if it concerns yellow cake or not. The results will be released on Thursday".

Areva's Trekkopje is one of the few mines in Namibia that has processing facilities for yellow cake -- a form of uranium ore that can be enriched for nuclear fuel or, if enriched to a much higher level, for use in weapons.

The four suspects were expected to appear in court later on Monday.

<http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE77S0F520110829?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews>

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

MiG Denies Stealth Technology Transfer to China for J-20 Fighter

26 August 2011

Russia has never transferred any stealth technology to China to assist it with its J-20 Black Eagle fifth-generation stealth fighter prototype, Russian plane maker MiG said on Friday.

"We are not delivering any equipment to China, and never have," MiG spokeswoman Yelena Fyodorova said.

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MiG's statement follows claims in the Russian and foreign press last week that China's J-20, unveiled over six months ago, is based on technology and components from the Russian Mikoyan Article 1.44, a stealth technology demonstrator aircraft, development of which was suspended.

Some analysts say the aircraft have close similarities.

"The back end of the J-20 looks awfully like the 1.44, as does the overall layout with delta canards," said Douglas Barrie, an air warfare specialist at the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies.

"If it's a coincidence, it's a striking one. Russia may have provided technical support, but there is nothing substantial to prove that. China has however relied on Russia for much of its defense procurement for a decade and a half," he added.

China's J-20 Black Eagle is thought to be conceptually similar to the U.S. F-22 Raptor and the Russian T-50 jets, but is likely to be just a technology demonstrator or prototype rather than a viable fighter.

China has been working on a future fighter program since the mid-1990s, but the J-20 is not expected to enter service before 2018-2020.

Earlier in the month, Mikhail Pogosyan, the head of Russia's United Aircraft Corporation said that China's fifth-generation fighter program is more for effect than substance and branded the maiden flight as a "show-off."

China relied on the Soviet Union for much of its aviation technology until the Sino-Soviet split after 1961. China then carried on developing copies of Soviet and Russian aircraft.

Beijing also relies on Russian engines, radars and electronic components for many of its other aircraft, such as the JF-17 fighter it developed jointly with Pakistan.

MOSCOW, August 26 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20110826/166209279.html

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Times of India - India

Russia Successfully Test-Launches Ballistic Missile

Press Trust of India (PTI)

August 27, 2011

MOSCOW: Russia on Saturday successfully test launched its Bulava inter-continental ballistic missile to its maximum range of 8,000 km, in a boost to the country's defence capabilities.

The missile was fired successfully by the White sea-based Russian nuclear submarine Yuri Dolgoruky, the Defence Ministry said today.

The successful launch of the Bulava came after a string of setbacks suffered by this programme. Only eight of its previous 15 launches were officially declared successful.

"The regular launch of the missile was conducted at 7:20 am Moscow time from a submerged position from the regular carrier in line with the state flight development tests at a maximum flight range of the missile," a defence ministry spokesman was quoted as saying by Russian news agency RIA Novosti.

The missile successfully reached its target in the Pacific Ocean in accordance with the necessary shipping security measures, the spokesman said.

The successful test of the missile was reported to President Dmitry Medvedev by the defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov.

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The Bulava, expected to become Russia's main naval strategic missile, is capable of carrying 10 warheads with a range of 8,000 km.

The first test launch from the Yuri Dolgoruky was conducted on June 28, 2011. Before that the missiles were fired from the typhoon-class Dmitry Donskoy submarine.

The three-stage missile is specifically designed for deployment on Borey class nuclear submarines.

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/europe/Russia-successfully-test-launches-ballistic-missile/articleshow/9760481.cms>

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Bio Prep Watch

America Protected from Bioweapons by Massive Technology System

By Ted Purlain

August 29, 2011

Scientists at federal research labs are defending the United States against the threat of biological weapons through the development of a nationwide system designed to check the air for germs such as anthrax and smallpox.

After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Tom Slezak and other government researchers began work on a pathogen early warning system known as Biowatch, the Associated Press reports. The Biowatch system is currently deployed in approximately 30 cities across the country, located in secret near high-profile targets such as subways and stadiums.

Biowatch sucks in city air through filters that are collected every day by technicians and then tested for the DNA of dangerous bioagents. The program is designed to alert authorities in the event of the release of deadly germs before patients show up sick at hospitals.

Many of the system's details are kept secret in order to keep potential terrorists guessing, including the exact number of monitors located in each city as well as the pathogens they test for, the AP reports. Officials admit, however, that Washington and New York are heavily monitored. According to Slezak, Biowatch covers 80 percent of the U.S. population.

The system has raised several alerts about the presence of potentially harmful microbes since it was installed. Biowatch detected tularemia the day after a 2005 anti-war protest on the Washington Mall. Further tests revealed the germs to be naturally occurring.

"We have to be able to make millions of measurements and never have a single false positive measurement," David Rakestraw, the head of the weapons of mass destruction countermeasures program at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, said, the AP reports.

Not everyone is convinced Biowatch is a silver bullet. The system is extremely labor intensive and expensive to maintain. According to budget analysts at the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, the government has spent more than \$500 million dollars on the program.

"What we basically deployed were glorified vacuum cleaners," Penrose "Parney" Albright said, according to the AP. Albright oversaw the system's deployment as the Department of Homeland Security's director of anti-weapons of mass destruction research and development under President George W. Bush.

Albright said that the system can be streamlined by greater use of technological developments. By relying on chips in the detectors themselves, the system should be capable of testing for more than 3,000 types of germs, as

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opposed to the small handful now sought. Scientists would then be alerted to test samples that came back positive.

Many believe Biowatch should only be seen as one part of a broader campaign to protect the country from bioterror.

"It's not all that we need," Frances Downes, the director of public health laboratories for Michigan said, the AP reports. "We can't assume it's a safety blanket and it's covering us and we're always going to know about a (bioterror) attack."

<http://bioprepwatch.com/news/262897-america-protected-from-bioweapons-by-massive-technology-system>

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Knoxville News Sentinel

Atomic City Underground Blog

Federal Safety Board Slams Y-12 for Not Following Rules

By Frank Munger

Knoxville News Sentinel

August 30, 2011

OAK RIDGE — A federal safety board is again criticizing the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant for not following procedures, raising concern that the persistent problems are "systemic" and undermining the safety of plant operations.

Staff of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board earlier this year conducted an extensive review of how the government's contractor, B&W Y-12, follows technical procedures and conducts operations. The review was prompted by a number of previous incidents, including a June 2010 fire that was caused when workers violated a procedure during a "routine dismantlement operation" involving a warhead component of depleted uranium.

DNFSB Chairman Peter Winokur said the April review found more shortcomings.

"The staff identified additional examples of weaknesses in procedures and their use by B&W personnel that have the potential to jeopardize the safety of workers and possibly that of the public and the environment," Winokur wrote in an Aug. 25 letter to Tom D'Agostino, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

Winokur emphasized the importance of conducting operations with "strict adherence" to technical procedures to ensure safety at the nuclear weapons facility. The board is concerned that Y-12's difficulties "point to systemic problems with the safe execution of nuclear operations and management oversight of these activities."

Winokur did, however, say the board was encouraged by some of Y-12's planned actions to address these issues.

Darrel Kohlhorst, president of B&W Y-12, emphasized the contractor's commitment to safety and fixing what's wrong. In a statement released Monday evening, Kohlhorst said, "Operations at Y-12 are safe. When work is not completed to our standards, we evaluate the cause and implement corrective actions, but we have consistently completed our work without harm to our workers, the public and the environment."

During the past year, Y-12 has implemented a number of changes, including rewriting procedures, new training and increased management oversight, Kohlhorst said. He said B&W recently appointed an executive team to analyze the plant's nuclear operations.

In his letter to D'Agostino, Winokur said the board wants the National Nuclear Security Administration to provide a report and briefing within six months that addresses B&W's response to the weaknesses identified in the report and assesses their effectiveness. He said the board also wanted to see a "path forward" to resolve any newly identified issues.

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Following the June 2010 fire, which occurred in a facility known as Beta-2E, Y-12 halted dismantlement operations for a couple of weeks. However, just a few months later, operators working in the same Y-12 area knowingly skipped a procedural step while disassembling another nuclear weapons part.

The safety board indicated that corrective actions have not always corrected the problems.

Even though NNSA assigned an additional overseer for the dismantlement operations at Beta-2E and B&W increased surveillance, the safety report noted, "It is apparent that these corrective actions have not been effective in determining or addressing the root cause for the issues associated with these deficiencies in conduct of operations."

Ralph Hutchison, coordinator of the Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance, said the safety's board report raises serious concerns. "This report calls into question the fundamental commitment to worker and public safety at Y-12," Hutchison said in a statement released Monday. "

"This is a facility where we cannot afford to have 'the accident,' and the only way to insure against it is for people to be utterly scrupulous about safety."

<http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/aug/30/federal-safety-board-slams-y-12s/>

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Wall Street Journal
August 27, 2011

Al Qaeda's No. 2 Killed in Pakistan

By ADAM ENTOUS And SIOBHAN GORMAN

WASHINGTON—A U.S. drone strike killed al Qaeda's no. 2 leader, Attiyah Abd al-Rahman, earlier this week in the tribal areas of Pakistan, in the biggest blow to the network since Osama bin Laden's death in May, officials said Saturday.

The U.S. believes the death of Mr. Rahman, in a Central Intelligence Agency drone strike, will further degrade al Qaeda's operational capabilities at a time when U.S. intelligence agencies believe they may be within reach of defeating the network behind the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

Mr. Rahman assumed a bigger role in running the organization after U.S. Navy SEALs killed al Qaeda leader bin Laden in Pakistan in May, the officials said.

Mr. Rahman has long been one of the Central Intelligence Agency's highest-priority targets in Pakistan.

"Attiyah's death is a tremendous loss for al Qaeda," a senior Obama administration official said. "He had multiple responsibilities in the organization and will be very difficult to replace."

Ayman al-Zawahiri, who took over the helm of al Qaeda in Pakistan after bin Laden's death, has relied heavily on Mr. Rahman "to help guide and run the organization," the senior administration official said.

Materials seized by the Navy SEALs from bin Laden's compound showed that Mr. Rahman was "deeply involved in directing al Qaeda's operations even before the raid," the official added.

Mr. Rahman frequently spoke for top al Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden and Mr. Zawahiri. "Zawahiri needed Attiyah's experience and connections to help manage al Qaeda," a U.S. official said. "Now it will be even harder for him to consolidate control."

Mr. Rahman was the operational leader of al Qaeda and close associate of bin Laden. When bin Laden was killed, Mr. Rahman rose to become second in command to Mr. Zawahiri.

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Mr. Raman was a confidant of bin Laden, who consulted with Mr. Rahman on a range of operational matters. The two exchanged communications via courier as they attempted to field a team to carry out an attack on the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, according to documents seized from bin Laden's hideout. The plans were only in the discussion phase, U.S. officials said, and bin Laden repeatedly rejected Mr. Rahman's candidates to lead the team.

He also was a critical interlocutor with other militant groups, the bin Laden documents showed. "Everyone trusted him," a U.S. official said. "He planned the details of al Qaeda operations and its propaganda. His combination of background, experience, and abilities are unique in al Qaeda-without question, they will not be easily replaced."

Mr. Rahman, an explosives specialist, also previously served as al Qaeda's point person in Iran.

In 2005, he authored a letter to then al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi warning that Mr. Zarqawi could lose his post if he didn't stop killing fellow Sunnis in Iraq.

Born in 1969, Mr. Rahman joined al Qaeda as a teenager in the 1980s, and in the past several years, he rose to prominence within the Qaeda ranks.

Officials said Mr. Rahman was killed in Waziristan on Aug. 22.

The CIA frequently conducts drone strikes in the area but officials generally won't comment on the operations because they are covert.

Some senior current and former Obama administration officials have started raising questions about the U.S.'s heavy reliance on drones in the tribal areas of Pakistan. While effective against so-called high-value targets, these officials say the large number of strikes the CIA carries out targeting Taliban foot-soldiers deeply strains relations with Islamabad, jeopardizing broader cooperation. They have urged the CIA to be more "judicious" about using the drones.

Defenders of the drone program countered on Saturday that the death of Mr. Rahman showed why the pace of strikes must not be rolled back at this time.

"Dialing back on al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, especially while they try to regroup after bin Laden's death, isn't the way to go. For the sake of our national security, they need to be knocked out for good," a U.S. official said.

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904787404576534572852358298.html>

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New York Times

Al Qaeda Affiliates Growing Independent

By MARK MAZZETTI

August 30, 2011

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WASHINGTON — At some point in coming days, a shadowy group of Al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan who make up the network's "General Command" is likely to announce a replacement for Atiyah abd al-Rahman, the Libyan chief of operations who was killed last week in a drone strike launched by the Central Intelligence Agency.

But as the 10th anniversary of the group's most successful strike approaches, the key question is: Does it matter?

In many ways, a successor to Mr. Rahman would have a familiar role in the terrorist group. He would be in charge of coordinating attacks against the United States and Europe, delivering messages from the new leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, to the rank and file, and managing sometimes strained relations between Al Qaeda's Pakistan-based leadership and the group's far-flung affiliates throughout the Middle East and Africa.



But even as Al Qaeda's leadership continues to project an image of control, many terrorism experts and American intelligence officials say that the members of this circle of maybe a dozen operatives — many of whom served for years as Osama bin Laden's closest confidants — are at risk of being marginalized not only by the global jihad movement but by the Qaeda affiliates they helped spawn. With their ranks thinned by a relentless barrage of drone strikes, some experts believe, Al Qaeda's operatives in Pakistan resemble a driver holding a steering wheel that is no longer attached to the car.

"With the death of guys like Atiyah, it's increasingly likely that the Al Qaeda affiliate groups are just going to start doing their own thing," said Brian Fishman, a terrorism analyst at the New America Foundation. "At some point, the guys in Pakistan might be reduced to issuing a lot of public statements and hoping for the best."

Even with the network's operatives in Pakistan under siege, Al Qaeda's wings in Yemen and North Africa have had little difficulty continuing a wave of violence. The chaos and power vacuum in Yemen have allowed operatives there to gain control over large swaths of the country's southern territories, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has claimed responsibility for a suicide attack that killed 16 soldiers and two civilians on Friday at an Algerian military academy. The same day, a Nigerian terrorist group that has cultivated ties to Al Qaeda killed dozens of people when it blew up the United Nations headquarters in Nigeria's capital, Abuja.

"For the past two years, the affiliates have been gaining in stature while core Al Qaeda has been declining," said a senior American counterterrorism official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because intelligence assessments of Al Qaeda are classified. "Bin Laden's death accelerated this trend, and Atiyah's death is the icing on the cake."

The drone attack that killed Mr. Rahman came just weeks after President Obama's top adviser on Pakistan said that the United States had just six months to deliver "a knockout blow" to Al Qaeda's senior leadership in Pakistan — while the group was still in turmoil after the killing of Bin Laden. Making veiled references to the C.I.A.'s drone campaign, the adviser, Douglas E. Lute, said at a security conference that the United States needed to escalate strikes in Pakistan to take advantage of the disarray within Al Qaeda's senior ranks.

Now, Al Qaeda will have to dig into its ranks to replace Mr. Rahman, which many experts said will not be easy. American officials said that one candidate is Abu Yahya al-Libi, another Libyan operative who became more prominent after he escaped from the American military prison at Bagram in Afghanistan in 2005.

While Mr. Rahman was hardly among Al Qaeda's most well-known figures, American officials said that his importance to the network came from the close ties he had forged with militant leaders during the 1990s, a time when Al Qaeda was a more centralized organization based largely in Afghanistan. Even after the network dispersed after the Sept. 11 attacks and affiliate groups emerged in countries like Iraq and Yemen, he relied on these longstanding relationships to help Bin Laden maintain control over the affiliates.

The senior American official said that Mr. Rahman acted as Al Qaeda's "human Rolodex," an assessment bolstered by documents seized from Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

For instance, in late 2005, Mr. Rahman chastised Abu Musab al Zarqawi — the leader of Al Qaeda's wing in Iraq — for carrying out attacks against Shiite Muslims, which he worried would fracture the insurgency against American troops in Iraq. Mr. Rahman wrote a letter to Mr. Zarqawi, whom he had known for years, threatening to remove him from the top of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia if he did not change his ways.

More recently, according to the Abbottabad documents, Mr. Rahman weighed in about who should be in charge of Al Qaeda's group in Yemen, and he even helped broker the partnership between Al Qaeda and a North African militant group that eventually agreed to rename itself Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

But some American officials said that the group is now largely independent of Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, and that there is even evidence that various affiliated groups across Northern Africa might increasingly be acting in league with one another.



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Gen. Carter F. Ham, the head of the military's Africa Command, said in a telephone interview last week that the group that claimed responsibility for the recent attack in Nigeria, Boko Haram, has said publicly that it plans to tether itself more closely to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and to the Shabab, the militant group operating in Somalia.

Recent American intelligence assessments have found that Boko Haram has trained with Qaeda-linked militants in camps in the deserts of Mali, and may seek to expand its campaign of violence beyond Nigeria.

Eric Schmitt contributed reporting.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/world/asia/30qaeda.html>

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UN News Centre
August 29, 2011

Top UN Officials Call on Hold-Out States to Ratify Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests

Warning that voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests are not enough, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today called on all Member States that have not yet done so to urgently ratify the United Nations-backed treaty banning them.

"Over the course of the Cold War, hundreds of nuclear weapon tests left behind a devastating legacy for local citizens and their natural environment," he said in a message marking the *International Day against Nuclear Tests*. "Current voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests are valuable, yet they are no substitute for a global ban."

General Assembly President Joseph Deiss also called on the hold-out States to ratify the treaty, citing the "dreadful dangers" for both humans and the environment from past tests. "The fallout of nuclear tests caused diseases, poisoned the food chain and contaminated the water and its ecosystems; these effects are still felt today," he said in a message.

Out of a total listed number of 195 States, 182 have so far signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and 154 have ratified it. For the treaty to enter into force ratification is required from the so-called Annex 2 States. Of these China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States have yet to ratify it.

"We urgently need new progress in achieving a world free of both nuclear tests and nuclear weapons," Mr. Ban said, citing the "the vital importance" of the treaty's entry into force and noting that its verification regime has proved to be a valuable instrument for international cooperation.

"I am fully confident of its future ability to provide an independent, reliable and cost-effective means of verifying, and therefore deterring, any violation of the treaty's provisions. For these reasons, I urge all States that have not yet signed or ratified the treaty to do so as a matter of priority," he added calling such a move "a bold step towards a safer and saner world for all."

The General Assembly proclaimed the Day in December 2009 and it was first celebrated last year. Various activities are planned throughout the world today, such as symposia, conferences, exhibits, competitions, publications, media broadcasts and others.

Noting that the Day also marks the 20th anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in Kazakhstan, Mr. Ban recalled visiting "the scene of this dark chapter in human history," and stressed his support for the Kazakh Government and people as they continue to cope with the aftermath.

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"I commend efforts to ensure that something positive may result from highlighting the horrific effects of these tests," he said.

Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, also stressed the importance of the closure of the Semipalatinsk site, noting that it was the scene of nearly a quarter of all nuclear weapon tests.

"It was an early example and it was a message – the message that the discontinuation of nuclear weapons tests is possible, discontinuation of a test site is possible or, going even further, discontinuation of nuclear weapons arsenals is possible," he told UN Radio.

"Four to five hundred nuclear weapons tests took place during the last 50 years. During the last 10 years there were two. Two too many, I would say. But we are closing the door on nuclear weapons tests. We are creating a no-test law and order, and we are implementing that law and order."

Those tests were carried out by the DPRK in 2006 and 2009, after which the Security Council imposed sanctions, including an arms embargo, inspections of cargo suspected of containing banned items related to the country's nuclear and ballistic missile activities, and financial restrictions.

<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39401&Cr=nuclear&Cr1=>

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Voice of Russia – Russia

OPINION/Commentary

Nuclear Threat from the Korean Peninsula

By Kudashkina Ekaterina

August 29, 2011

Interview with Lieutenant-General Gennady Yevstafyev, non-proliferation expert.

How advanced is the nuclear program in North Korea?

As a matter of fact, it is quite a substantial nuclear program in North Korea; it has a long story, mostly for political reasons and one of the major reasons is the survival of the North Korean regime.

But how do you explain the renewal of the diplomatic activity in Pyongyang? Could it be somehow related to the latest developments in the Arab world?

Interestingly enough, the fate of Mr. Gaddafi who renounced nuclear program seven years ago under the pressure of British and Americans would be very seriously studied in Pyongyang because they might think that the ambiguity around the Libyan nuclear program was preventing the West from doing something serious about Libya and now, when they came to understand everything about the Libyan weapon of mass destruction program, they have taken such resolute actions against the Libyan regime. But the difference is that by all standards we have to admit that North Korea is a nuclear power. There were two nuclear tests there; of course, some people say and it could be very true that the first test was not very successful, but, nevertheless, it was a nuclear test, and the second test is admitted to be very successful but with rather low intensity. Nevertheless, we have to take it for granted that North Korea has mastered the production of nuclear weapons and we have to live with that, which in the long run means that if you want to get rid of nuclear weapon in North Korea, you have to give the North Korean regime absolutely unprecedented stimuli, guarantees and certain economic privileges.

But how good are the chances that the new round of negotiations would be successful?

As it stands now, all the time we are in a situation of rope-a-dope with the North Korean negotiations; it is also very susceptible to all kinds of changes. The major change of the American policy towards North Korea was in

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2002 and it was really negatively received not only in North Korea but in surrounding countries and behind this policy was Mr. John Bolton who was the architect of American non-proliferation policy; he is a person who is always for harsh methods in pursuing American policies in certain areas, especially non-proliferation. So, there is a serious factor - North Korean nuclear program - and if we agree (and it appears that everybody agrees on that and the Russian policy is also based on the idea of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula), if we agree that this is the final aim of the whole exercise, then we have to admit that the North Korean military nuclear program is an extremely serious factor. There were a number of attempts to try and find a solution to this problem, and, of course, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and being very skeptical of certain elements of the Chinese policy, the North Korean leaders considered themselves the only remnant of the Communist world and decided that they would deal with the Americans directly on the bases of bilateral relations because they strongly believe that the country which would decide everything is the United States – and that is what they do; as a matter of fact, they have more trust to Americans than to anybody else.

But does that trust manifest itself in some practical terms?

With all the secrecy which exists in North Korea and limitations of other people's access to North Korean facilities in nuclear field, the American scientists, first of all from Los Alamos and Stanford universities, regularly visit North Korean specialists, they are shown their facilities and one of them, for example, Mr. Carlin visited North Korean nuclear facilities over 30 times during the last 15 years, and, of course, the knowledge of these people is tremendous; among those people is Mr. Siegfried Hecker who is an outstanding specialist in nuclear sciences, especially in plutonium production and he was there about 9 or 10 times, they were showing him their facilities and last time he went there in November 2010. Exactly these people were shown new elements of North Korean nuclear program; first of all, they were shown the centrifuge, though it is called a pilot plant centrifuges which was not mentioned previously and there were 2000 centrifuges working - that is why it was called a pilot plant centrifuges; and the construction of light-water reactor on the territory of Yongbyon, the major center of nuclear research in North Korea; and they were shown the uranium enrichment process which was not in existence because previously the North Koreans were reprocessing plutonium from used fuel – these are the elements of policy which they pursue, showing to the Americans what they have.

But what is the reason? Why would they do it?

It is a reminder that they have something which they can use, first of all, to improve their position in the field of nuclear development and, secondly, it was an attempt to show that they want, because Americans have decided not to proceed with KEDO famous program and to stop building a light-water reactor in the area of Kumho, so they were showing that they are in need of light-water reactors and they decided to build themselves light-water reactors, and for light-water reactors you need enriched uranium, and for that you need centrifuges. Of course, the level of enrichment is quite low but, nevertheless, American specialists came to a conclusion that it was not the only uranium enrichment facility which exists in North Korea; they suspect that there is another very well established enrichment facility for uranium somewhere else.

Where do they get the technology?

That is a big question. Many people believe that despite all expert control measures they have mastered access to crucial technology in this field; many people, and I think they are quite right, many people believe that Abdul Qadeer Khan's black market system was a very important factor for North Koreans mastering the technology of uranium enrichment, but I do not think it is the only black market.

So, now we come to the relations between North Korea and Pakistan, right?

North Koreans, it is very well-known, have supplied technologies for Pakistan's missile industry. There is every reason to believe that there was an exchange, though at the beginning the North Koreans were not so much eager to develop this uranium enrichment technology because by that time they had gas-cooled reactors which produced enough plutonium. But, nevertheless, they expected to have light-water reactors first from the Soviet



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Union and this did not happen; then from the United States and consortium of Western countries – in the long run it did not work. So, when they came to form a conclusion that there is no chance of getting this light-water reactor technology from the West, then they have decided to develop enrichment of uranium which is an indispensable part of light-water technology and they proceed with pilot or experimental light-water reactor which they claim would go into operation in 2012. Some people think it is not possible because a light-water reactor requires more technological developments than we see in existence in North Korea, but, nevertheless, they would get those parts which they do not produce themselves from abroad or somebody would sell them.

So, what is the situation now that North Korea has been saying it is ready to resume nuclear talks?

Basically, as far as nuclear program is concerned, we have to take into account two major factors. First of all, by all calculations, very reasonable calculations, we should expect North Korea to possess about 45 kilos of highly weapon-grade enriched plutonium. Since they already used it into explosions, the number could be less than what I mentioned, but, nevertheless, I think and some people also think that there is enough weapon-grade plutonium for five-seven additional nuclear weapons which North Korean might have or at least could produce. This is everybody's guess on the bases of technical calculations and that is why the major thing is to get an idea of the previous nuclear program of North Korea - this is what is required by the International Atomic Agency. The second problem is the inspections.

But are they going to let inspectors in?

We have to understand that North Koreans, when there were positive developments as far as light-water reactors and other things, they allowed the International Atomic Agency to monitor their facilities and for one year there was a quite serious monitoring, but only of Yongbyon facility, so we have very limited knowledge about what else they have since they have put two tests which means that they have infrastructure for arranging the test. That is why the problem to reveal the previous activity in this field is almost impossible. I do not see any way of how it could be arranged; North Koreans would definitely resist any attempt to this because this is the secret society, they have many other secrets in their possession. Thirdly, nuclear limitations, which some people want to put on North Korea all the time, are connected with missile developments, even the UN resolutions require North Korea to stop nuclear and missile tests which is, in my judgment, very doubtful. Fourthly, light-water technology is also vulnerable from the point of view of diverting the spent fuel for reprocessing and producing plutonium. These problems which exist there in North Korea and its natural desire to have nuclear electricity is quite understandable because the country is extremely poor in energy resources and that is why before the light-water reactors be put into operation they would be needed tremendous support of North Korean industry with energy supplies.

But, as far as I understand, this was a part of the Kyoto deal? What happened to it?

Americans are always clever, they did not want to pay and they wanted to make South Korea and Japan to pay for that, for supply of energy resources, but when those countries decided that it is a big burden for them, Americans washed their hands and the whole thing started to crumble.

Mr. Yevstafyev, there are very interesting points that you actually touched upon and which I want to develop a little bit. So, one point is that when you started saying that the situation in Libya, with the Libyan program, could have repercussions on the negotiations with North Korea, but I am just curious, is the Libyan nuclear program comparable to the one in North Korea?

No, there is no comparison because the North Korean nuclear program is a very well developed system whereas due to the Arab attitude towards to the whole scientific research Libyan program was in disarray, was in shambles and you could not have expected Libya to master this technology in the foreseeable future. So, there is a big difference. There is also a political parallel: Libyan regime was isolated on the international scene and North Korean regime is isolated in the contemporary world; that is a very strict regime, let me put it this way, it is internally very much politically regulated. So, there are certain semblances between the two and the third semblance is that the Western countries do not hide their idea of toppling sooner or later the North Korean

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regime and the only country which is very afraid of this is South Korea because they are afraid that millions of North Koreans – hungry and poor – would flee to South Korea and they would not cope with this influx of the people. This is maybe the answer to your question.

But, basically, there is no doubt that the case of Libya would strengthen the position of North Korea at those negotiations. My question now is: is the West prepared to consider some alternative ways of resolving this standoff instead of insisting on Korea giving up its nuclear program all together?

No, at the moment it is not an immediate issue of the whole story; at the moment the problem is to start negotiations and to try to find positions, to identify positions with which both sides come to negotiations, but with the final aim which declares in the first place the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Americans claim that they have removed their nuclear forces from North Korea and we take it by their word; Americans are no better than North Koreans, nobody has ever had a chance to check it, they declared it and we say – ok, we believe you, hopefully, you are true to your word. And North Koreans, as you know, departed, but in a very strange way – they departed from the Nonproliferation Treaty, they left the Nonproliferation Treaty but in a very inconsequential way and we never know what in reality they think, but there is no doubt that unless they get certain political and security guarantees, they would never renounce their nuclear weapon.

There is the stalemate, right? The positions of all parties are very rigid, so where is the space for compromise?

No, the compromise could be found step by step. It was a good idea to try to start with the problems which were at that time extremely acute for North Korea: they had natural disasters, flooding, all these kinds of things and they had tremendous shortages of energy resources, so the idea was to try to help them to settle these problems and to somehow conquer their trust, but America did everything possible to destroy this trust because one day they are making political declarations about the necessity of negotiations, the second day they dissolve KEDO and liquidate the program of building light-water reactors; by the way, the construction is abandoned, 1/10 of the construction work has been completed. They should be logical, there should be more understanding of certain necessities of North Korean regime and they should give some incentives for them to move accordingly and not only pressing them to act the way we wish them to act. Every step has to be accompanied by some help and further incentives for them to move.

<http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/08/29/55239642.html>

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The Nation – Pakistan
OPINION

Need for FMCT to Be Realistic

Tuesday, August 30, 2011

By Imran Malik

Pakistan has been one of the main objectors to starting negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), due to the fact that it is predicated upon a discriminatory disposition of perpetuating inequalities and disparities. It also objects virulently to its potentially biased mode of implementation by the United States, members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and others. The State considers the treaty to be criminally insensitive to its strategic compulsions and regional realities, and that it directly impinges upon its sovereignty. Pakistan's response to the treaty thus must cater for all contingencies of strategic import arising out of its potential operationalisation.

The country's main objection is that the FMCT concerns itself only with the cutting off future stocks of fissile materials without taking into account the existing stocks. Fissile material asymmetries and superiorities will thus be frozen for good - favouring India in South Asia and Israel in the Middle East!

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India's ability to produce more weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been further enhanced by the Washington's self-serving civilian nuclear power deal with it. This deal allows India to import nuclear fuel from the NSG, and thus freeing up its domestic production of fissile material for its military nuclear programme, giving it a potentially additional capability of 40 to 60 nuclear weapons a year - multiplying Pakistan's sense of insecurity and negative threat perceptions by that much more!

Furthermore, the transfer of latest defence and space technologies from the US, and other members of the NSG, is helping India modernise its nuclear assets or systems. This is, indeed, hi-tech force multiplication at a grand scale. Unfairly, Pakistan continues to suffer embargoes on similar technologies. This is widening the differential in the nuclear forces between India and Pakistan - qualitatively and quantitatively. For example, the acquisition of Ballistic Missile Defence Systems (BMDS) by India would erode the deterrent value of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and seriously disturb the strategic equilibrium in the regional context. In a hypothetical case, India could destroy the bulk of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in a first strike, and then quantitatively degrade its second strike response through the modern BMDS to either naught or to an acceptable level for it!

Pakistan will, thus, be forced to seek a counter to this development. This could mean a triad capability - land, air and sea based nuclear launch platforms, which in turn could give further impetus to the already ferocious nuclear arms race with devastating strategic and economic implications.

The world must understand Pakistan's predicament. The country faces an existential threat from an inimical India. There is a vast and growing technological and quantitative differential between the conventional forces of the two countries. Pakistan's nuclear programme is essentially geared to neutralise this Indian conventional superiority. Therefore, Pakistan's reliance on its nuclear forces becomes directly proportional to the differential in the conventional forces of both the countries - the larger the differential, the more will Pakistan rely upon its nuclear forces and vice versa.

Similarly, the larger the differential, the lower would be Pakistan's thresholds!

Even more seriously, a stage may come when Pakistan may be constrained to make a strategic paradigm shift in its military strategy - making its nuclear strategy the predominant one over land, air and maritime strategies! That may have potentially horrendous strategic implications for the region. So the US would be well advised to desist from starting something whose implications it has no control over and which it cannot bring to a sensible closure.

Needless to say that Pakistan's nuclear forces assume *savoir like* proportions for it. They are in fact "The Equalisers" - as they even up the odds for the nation in seriously hostile geopolitical and geostrategic environments. The FMCT in its current form threatens to negate and neutralise these Equalisers with devastating existential implications for Pakistan. Thus, it is constrained to ensure that this deterrence is not degraded or neutralised, ever - irrespective of the cost.

Pakistan must also make the point that the geopolitical and geostrategic environments that were the *raison d'être* of this treaty have changed drastically. We now have India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and potentially Iran on the nuclear bandwagon too. Their geostrategic compulsions in their regional contexts have to be factored in as well.

The situation is further compounded by the US civil nuclear power deal with India, which will cause the implementation of the treaty to be held to ransom, primarily because of its blatant bias and disregard of strategic regional realities. Therefore, the treaty will need to take into account the wider context of nuclear disparities and inequities it threatens to freeze and their strategic consequences and implications.

Pakistan should also enlarge the spectrum of its arguments and move it beyond the Indo-Pak and even South Asian contexts. Similar inequities will emerge in the Middle East between Israel, the Arab world and Iran. Pakistan and China must make efforts to bring more sanity, justice and fairplay into this treaty as a whole. Otherwise, it will fail to achieve anything that it will ever intend to.

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By default the FMCT must be more realistic than idealistic. It must not be considered in isolation either. It must cater for regional and bilateral realities, sensitivities and compulsions. Elements of demonstrable and tangible justice, fairplay and non-discrimination have to be brought into the treaty, for example, the issue of existing stocks. Only then will it be acceptable to countries like Pakistan, Iran, North Korea et al. Only an equitable and unbiased treaty will work. And the US and the NSG must pay heed, else this and similar international regimes will continue to lose credibility at the hands of their expediencies and crass commercial benefits.

The writer is a retired brigadier and defence analyst.

<http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Opinions/Columns/30-Aug-2011/Need-for-FMCT-to-be-realistic>

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The Moscow Times – Russia
OPINION/Analysis

Kremlin's Fear of China Drives Its Foreign Policy

30 August 2011

By Alejandro Sueldo

Russia is very concerned about China, but this is driven more by fears about China's capabilities than any real threats.

Russia perceives China as being highly unpredictable and worries about Beijing's technological dominance, growing military strength and demographic and economic expansion into Siberia, which is sparsely populated but resource-rich.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin's saber-rattling in the Far East, while purportedly aimed at protecting the Kuril Islands from a weak Japan, is Moscow's subtle signal to Beijing.

The real threat for Russia is China's capabilities. Beijing's ability to expand its nuclear arsenal is worrisome because at parity levels, Russia's nuclear deterrent loses credibility in relation to China's greater counterstrike potential. Thus, fear, which is the dominant factor behind the Kremlin's policy of maintaining nuclear superiority over China, hinders global efforts to decrease Russia's nuclear arsenal — in particular, its tactical weapons.

Moscow's appeals to engage other nuclear states in arms control are implicitly driven by fears of China. But Russia does not fully understand how to engage China and needs the United States to pressure Beijing to talk and for political cover should talks fail. But engaging China on arms control is not practical yet, given the disparities in size and type of each country's arsenals.

Russia's urgency to set its foot down amid China's rise is also driven by unsuccessful attempts to assert itself on many European security issues, namely NATO and U.S. missile defense systems. Moscow has learned its lesson and wants to assure that it has a voice on Asian security matters.

Shared concern over China offers Russia and the United States an opportunity to deepen relations with a strategy to engage and help contain China. Assuaging their concerns will require, among other initiatives, pressuring China to be more transparent about its military, eventually engaging China on arms control, and demonstrating that U.S. and Russian missile defense systems do not undermine China's strategic weapons.

Such a strategy, however, is wishful thinking for the time being. Historic distrust between Moscow and Washington, as well as the Kremlin's fear of provoking China, have shaped their dialogue for the past decade or so. But Russia's and the United States' place in the global arena will depend largely upon their ability to find the right balance between each other and China.

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<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/kremlins-fear-of-china-drives-its-foreign-policy/442862.html>

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Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses (ISDA) – India
OPINION/ISDA Comment

Issues Before the 7th Biological Weapons Review Conference

By Arvind Gupta

August 30, 2011

The 7th review conference (revcon) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (BTWC) is scheduled to be held from 5-22 December 2011 in Geneva. According to the decision taken in the April 2011 preparatory committee (prepcom) meeting for the revcon, the review conference will, in accordance with Article XII of the Convention, "review the operation of the Convention, taking into account, *inter alia*, new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention; the progress made by States Parties on the implementation of the obligations, under the Convention; progress of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations agreed, upon at the Sixth Review Conference."

The prepcom proposed a provisional agenda for the review conference. The agenda includes, *inter alia*, a general debate and discussion on the purpose of the Convention in the light of recent changes in the global environment and advances in life sciences as well as an article by article review of the Convention and crafting a roadmap for the future.

Background

Review conferences have been held approximately every five years. At each review conference, member countries get a chance to take stock of the implementation of the provisions of the BTWC. The last BTWC Revcon was held in 2006.

A brief description of the key provisions of the Convention would be in order here. The BTWC, consisting of fifteen articles, was perceived as a step towards complete and general disarmament. It was concluded in 1972 and came into force in 1975. Its purpose, as mentioned in the preamble of the Convention, was "to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons." Article I prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, retention, or retention of biological agents and toxins for weapons purposes. However, the use of such materials for peaceful purposes is not banned. Under Article II, states parties to the convention are obliged to destroy the stocks of the biological agents and toxins or divert them for peaceful purposes. Under Article III the transfer of such materials to other parties for non-peaceful purposes is prohibited.

Article IV deals with "necessary measures" that each state must take to implement its obligation under Article I. Under Article V, states parties to the Convention are obliged to consult and cooperate on matters relating to the Convention. Article VI deals with the breach of obligations. Under this article any state may "lodge a complaint" with the UN Security Council if it feels that a member state is violating the Convention.

Article X provides that the "Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses."

Since the signing of the Convention, the States Parties have been continuously struggling to make the Convention relevant to address new challenges. For instance, the issue of non-State actors getting access to bio-technologies has become salient in recent years.

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Issues Before the 7th Revcon

Compliance, verification and monitoring have been the major issues in previous BTWC discussions. BTWC does not have a formal verification provision. Russia and Iraq were found to be in violation of the Convention. Russia pursued a bio-weapons programme during and after the end of the Cold War. So did Iraq. Although the Convention provides for an approach to the UNSC to carry out investigations, this provision has not been invoked so far.

Efforts have been made in the past to strengthen the BTWC by negotiating a **legally binding protocol** to the treaty, which would have provided mandatory declaration and on-site inspection of relevant facilities. A draft protocol was prepared and circulated in 2001. The protocol was negotiated for six years but the United States rejected the draft and withdrew from the negotiations in 2001. This was a major challenge to the BTWC. The United States does not want its biotechnology industry to be subject to any verification measures under the treaty. Instead, it advocates national measures. No solution to the verification conundrum has been found as yet.

Confidence Building Measures are an important part of the Convention. Annual reporting has been mandated in order to supplement verification, promote transparency and information sharing. But, the format for reporting has not been updated since 1991. Moreover, only half the members have done any regular reporting.

A useful innovation of the last few years has been the setting up of the mechanism of inter-sessional meetings (ISU) of experts as well as States Parties. These meetings have been found to be useful as they promote exchange of views and strengthen confidence building. Whether the ISU mechanism should be extended, and if so, in what form, will be an issue for discussion at the 7th BTWC revcon.

Universality has been another issue of concern. Only 164 countries have so far ratified the convention. The Convention, it seems, is less popular than the Chemical Weapons Convention or even the contentious NPT.

The lack of progress in strengthening the BTWC has resulted in **ad hoc measures** outside the convention. Notable among these is UNSCR 1540, which calls for strengthening of national measures against bio-terrorism. Bio-terror and bio-safety are being taken seriously by many countries. In 2005, 193 member countries of the World Health Organisation adopted International Health Regulations which are binding, to strengthen bio-safety measures. Useful as these measures are, they do not directly strengthen the cause of disarmament.

Implementation of Article X has proved to be highly divisive. The article often clashes with Article III, which prohibits transfer of such technologies. A group of 41 countries, known as the Australia Group, operate an ad hoc export control regime, which restricts the export of dual use technologies to curb proliferation. This is strongly resented by the NAM group of countries. With exponential growth in biotechnologies and the bio-industry in recent years, the fears of non-state actors misusing the technological advances in life sciences have increased. There is an urgent need to ensure that the threat of bio attacks is tackled without unduly restricting the use of these technologies for peaceful and useful purposes.

India's Position

India's position on BTWC was laid out by Ambassador Hamid Ali Rao at the Experts' Meeting in Geneva in October 2010. India is for a verification mechanism. It has a good record of implementing its obligations under the BTWC. India's stated position is that it supports the further strengthening of the BTWC verification, its universalisation, CBMs, export controls and international cooperation consistent with the objectives of the BWC. In particular, India is in favour of the fullest implementation of Article X of the convention.

In recent years, India has taken several concrete measures in the area of bio-safety and security. It has formulated national guidelines to deal with various kinds of bio-disasters including epidemics, pandemics and bio-terrorism. It has fostered international cooperation and consulted the World Health Organisation and Food and Agricultural Organisation. India has suggested the enhancement of international capabilities to respond, investigate and



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mitigate alleged bio-attacks. It has strengthened its national legislation by enacting a WMD Act, which brings in line its export control efforts with international standards.

Given its record and its efforts to promote bio-security and bio-safety, India should adopt a proactive role in strengthening the BTWC further. It should throw its weight behind greater transparency, implementation of Article X and continuation of the inter-sessional mechanism of the meeting of experts. India should at the same time ensure that the interests of its burgeoning bio-industry are not compromised. India has already indicated its desire to join the Australia Group, which demonstrates its seriousness in pursuing export controls to curb proliferation.

Without effective verification, BTWC will remain weak. However, the prospects of evolving such a mechanism are not too bright. A large dose of political will, particularly on the part of the United States which has refused to accept the draft protocol to the Convention, will be required to address these concerns.

The author holds Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair at the IDSA. The views expressed are personal.

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IssuesBeforethe7thBiologicalWeaponsReviewConference_agupta_300811

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Chicago Tribune
OPINION/Editorial

Another Victory Over al-Qaida

Going forward, what will prevail — our onetime complacency or our fierce resolve?

August 30, 2011

A few months ago, Osama bin Laden and his operations chief, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, were discussing ideas on how to pursue al-Qaida's war against the United States — notably, an assault on our homeland on the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. It would serve as shocking proof that they still had the capacity to destroy and terrify Americans.

But neither man lived to see that milestone. Bin Laden died in a May raid by Navy SEALs. And last week, also in Pakistan, an American drone strike evidently killed al-Rahman, a Libyan explosives expert. Today, al-Qaida looks more ineffectual, damaged and beleaguered than at any time since the World Trade Center towers came crashing down.

Al-Rahman's death, if confirmed, is an important victory. Since bin Laden's death, he was often referred to as the No. 2 leader in the terrorist group, after Ayman al-Zawahiri.

But some experts think al-Rahman was the more important figure, with broader influence in al-Qaida and a critical role in its operations. One expert calls him "the only person that al-Qaida cannot afford to lose." Jihadists cannot fail to notice that he had been in the job less than a year, having been tapped to replace Fateh al-Masri — whose job was opened up by yet another lethal U.S. drone strike.

It's too early for an end-zone celebration or a "Mission Accomplished" banner in this fight. But al-Qaida has had a bad year — and a bad decade. Like a wounded rattlesnake, it remains dangerous. It has found, though, that being the focus of prolonged American attention is not a formula for long life.

The organizations has lost not only key leaders but countless foot soldiers. It has not pulled off a successful attack on Western soil since 2005, when it killed 52 people with bombs on the London transit system.

True, al-Qaida has affiliates in many places beyond South Asia, where the U.S. has directed its main effort. It has found fertile ground in places like Yemen, Somalia and Sudan. But the relentless U.S. campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan has deprived the group of its best base, where it has sturdy ties going back to the 1970s. Says Seth Jones of the Rand Corp., a defense think tank: "These relationships are deeper and stronger than the comparatively

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nascent, tenuous and fluid relationships" that al-Qaida has established elsewhere. And moving from South Asia to new sanctuaries, writes Jones, "makes al-Qaida operatives increasingly vulnerable to intelligence-collection and targeting."

The 9/11 attacks were possible partly because the United States, under both President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush, never fully acknowledged the danger posed by the group — and never gave high priority to exterminating it. Bin Laden got the idea that he and his fellow terrorists could kill infidels with impunity.

After 9/11, though, he found that America was an implacable, ingenious, deadly foe hellbent on victory. Unflagging concentration on the task of defeating al-Qaida explains why the United States has not been visited with any more such atrocities. The danger is that as a result, our attention will wander and our determination will slacken.

Our complacency was among the big reasons al-Qaida flourished in the time leading up to 9/11. Our fierce resolve is the main reason it is now a battered remnant struggling just to survive. What happens in the coming years will depend on which attitude prevails.

<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-qaida-20110830,0,1764951.story>

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